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Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings;
and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on the subject of the people of this country. I

Although the right of parents to send their children to parochial
schools in the fulfillment of state educational requirements was firmly
established by the Supreme Court in 1925,2 the ability of these parents to receive government aid remains a controversial issue. The
controlling principle to be applied in the determination of the constitutionality of aid programs is expressed in the establishment clause
of the first amendment, which provides that "Congress shall make no
3
law respecting the establishment of religion."
The Court's decisions regarding the constitutionality of state aid
to nonpublic schools have not been clear or predictable. Instead of
pronouncing rigid guidelines, the Court has adopted a more flexible
approach; one whose application has resulted in a state of uncertainty
among legislators. In a case representative of this trend, Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 4 the Court val-

idated a New York statutory scheme that provided for direct reimbursement to nonpublic school teachers for costs incurred in complying with state testing and recordkeeping requirements.

Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 100 S. Ct. 840, 851
(1980).
2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. This clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generally J.
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 19, at 850-70 (1st ed. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as J. NOWAK].
4 100 S. Ct. 840 (1980). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist
NOWXAK,

joined Justice White supporting the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting
opinion.

The Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty is a coalition of thirty-six organizations, including the New York State Council of Churches, the United Federation of
Teachers, the American Jewish Congress and the State Congress of Parents and Teachers. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1980, at BI, col. 6.
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The Supreme Court first considered the constitutional validity of

the New York statute in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty (Levitt 1),5 when the Court reviewed a statute
authorizing reimbursements to nonpublic schools for complying with
state requirements. 6 The Court utilized the Lemon v. Kurtzman 7
test to invalidate the statute. 8

The test provides that to avoid conflict

with the establishment clause an aid program must have a secular
ptrpose, its primary or principal effect must not advance nor inhibit
religion, and it must not result in excessive entanglement between

government and religion.

9

Two aspects of the legislation rendered it

5 113 U.S. 472 (1973).
6 Id. Requirements included administering exams and the reporting and recording of information. Id. at 474-75.
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8 413 U.S. at 478-82.
9 This tripartite test has evolved from numerous Supreme Court cases concerning the permissibilitv of state legislative enactments. The first step in the evolution was Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U. S. 1, rehearing denicd, 330 U.S. 855 (1947), where the Court upheld a statute
whereby parents of students using the public transportation system, including those students
attending nonpublic sectarian schools, received partial reimbursement for transportation costs.
Id. at 18. The statutory scheme was characterized as one which benefited the welfare of the
general public, rather than one which was designed to further the sectarian mission of religious
groups. Id.
Subsequent to Everson, a constitutional bipartite test addressing the "purpose and effect"
of a challenged statute remained the sole criterion for determining the permissibility of state aid
to religious schools. In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court upheld a statute
authorizing the loan of secular textbooks to children in grades seven through twelve. Id. at 249.
The Court reasoned that the books furnished at the request of the pupil benefited the parents
and children, not the schools. Id. at 243-44. The bipartite test was also applied in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), where the Court declared unconstitutional a
statute requiring Bible reading in public schools. Id. at 227. The legislation was viewed as
having a primary effect of advancing a religion whose tenets were based on the Bible. Id. at
224,
A third prong, the excessive entanglement test, was added in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970), where the Court upheld a New York statute, granting an exemption for propertv taxes to churches as part of a general exemption for nonprofit institutions. Id. at 680. The
statutory scheme was perceived as not fostering excessive entanglement between church and
state. Id. at 675.
The modern tripartite analysis was adopted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S, 602 (1971), in
which the Court invalidated two states' attempts to subsidize costs of parochial school education.
A Rhode Island statute permitting direct payment of wage subsidies to teachers in nonpublic
schools, and a Pennsylvania legislative enactment providing financial support to nonpublic
schools for costs relating to teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials for secular
purposes, were found to be violative of the third prong. In addition, the Court introduced "[a]
broader base of entanglement" characterized by the "divisive political potential" of the statutor'
schemes. Id. at 622.
Subsequent to Lemon, in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the
Court utilized the three pronged test to invalidate three forms of nonpublic school aid: tuition
reimbursements, tax benefits to parents, and grants for maintenance and repairs for schools. Id.
at 798. The Court struck down tuition reimbursements once again in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973).
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unconstitutional: the tests were prepared by nonpublic school
teachers x1 and the provisions, by authorizing an annual lump sum
payment failed to limit reimbursement to the actual costs incurred. I Internally prepared tests could potentially bster religious instruction, and the absence of an auditing provision to ensure that
monies were spent solely for secular services constituted impermissible.aid to religion. 12
In an attempt to conform to guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court, the New York legislature amended the statute. 13 The
revised statutory scheme included a provision mandating schools applying for aid to submit an accounting of actual costs incurred in performing the required tasks. 14 Once again the statute was challenged
on establishment clause grounds. 15 To decide whether the statute
Aid programs to sectarian colleges are analyzed in a different manner than aid to primary
and secondary schools because of less opportunity for religious inculcation. J. NOW AK, supra
note 3, at 858-61; Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From Separation to Diatente in
Church-State Relations, 55 N.C. L. REV. 563 (1977); Hilton, Race, Religion, and Constitutional
Restraints on Private Schools, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 329 (1977). See Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
10 413 U.S. at 474-75. The tests were basically of two types: state-prepared examinations,
such as "Regents examinations" and the "Pupil Evaluation Program Tests," and traditional
teacher-prepared tests. ld. at 475.
11 Id. at 480, 482. The Court stated that the New York statutory scheme contained "some of
the same constitutional flaws that led the Court to its decision in Nyquist." Id. at 479. The
statute was invalidated in Nyquist primarily on the ground that no attempt was made to ensure
that reimbursement pertained to the upkeep of facilities that were devoted exclusively to secular purposes. See note 9 supra. In Levitt I, the Court analogized to the Nyquist statute because
both advanced religion. 413 U.S. at 479. The Levitt statute lacked any means to ensure that
teacher-prepared tests would be free of religious instruction. Id. at 479-80.
12 413 U.S. at 480-82. Although the Court did not conclude that the teachers would act in
bad faith to contravene the establishment clause, Chief Justice Burger stated that "the potential
for conflict 'inheres in the situation,' and because of that the State is constitutionally compelled
to assure that the state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination." Id. at
480 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 617).
13 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt 1I), 414 F. Supp.
1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 507, as amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws ch.
508. Section 1 states legislative findings and purposes of the legislation. Section 3, describing
reimbursable costs, provides in pertinent part:
Apportionment. The commissioner shall annually apportion to each qualify'ing school
. . . an amount equal to the actual cost incurred by each such school during the
preceding school year for providing services required by law to be rendered to the
state in compliance with the requirements of the state's pupil evaluation program,
the basic educational data system, regents examinations, the statewide evaluation
plan, the uniform procedure for pupil attendance reporting, and other similar state
prepared examinations and reporting procedures.
Id. § 3. See § 7 (regarding auditing procedures).
1, 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 507, § 5 as amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 508.
15 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt II), 414 F. Supp. 1174
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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contravened the first amendment's prohibition of a law respecting the
establishment of a religion, the district court, in Levitt II, adopted
the three pronged test articulated in Lemon. 16 The court accepted
the legislature's goal "to provide educational opportunity of a quality
which will prepare its citizens for the challenges of American life" as
a valid secular purpose, thus not violative of the establishment
clause. 17
In analyzing the principal or primary effect of the statute, however, the court viewed the statutory aid as primarily benefiting sectarian schools. 18 The lower court accepted the aid to enterprise theory
set forth in Meek v. Pittinger.19 The theory provides that when secular and religious educational components form one religious enterprise, "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function ... necessarily
results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole." 20 Accordingly, the district court classified the statutory aid program as one

16 Id. at 1177-78. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
17 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt II), 414 F. Supp. 1174,
1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The "purpose test" has lost its significance since courts accept the express legislative purpose. See Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 2000 (1974).
's Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt II), 414 F. Supp. 1174,
1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Court acknowledged that "[a]ccording to defendants' answers to
plaintiffs' interrogatories, there [were] 1954 nonpublic schools, eligible to receive reimbursement pursuant to the statute, approximately 85% of which [were] religiously affiliated." Id. at
1176. See Note, 42 ALB. L. REV. 701, 708-17 (1978); Note, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1022 (1977).
9 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
20 Id. at 366. In Ieek, the Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute providing
auxiliary services, instructional materials, and equipment. Id. at 373. Although the Court upheld the statutory provision authorizing textbook loans to students, primarily based on stare
decisis, the "aid to enterprise theory'" was adopted. Id. at 362, 366. The Court concluded that
aid to even an ascertainablv secular component resulted in aid which had the primary effect of
advancing religion. Id. at 366. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Meek, concluded that
with the substantial amounts of direct support . . . it would simply ignore reality to
attempt to separate secular educational functions from the predominantly religious
role performed by mans of Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary
schools and to then characterize [the statute] as channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian.
421 U.S. at 365.
In addition, Justice Stewart adopted Justice Brennan's philosophical principle that " '[t]he
secular education . . . schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the
only reason for the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably intertwined.' " Id. at 366 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
See Public Funds v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), affd, 417 U.S. 961 (1974)
(New Jersey provision authorizing instructional material and equipment to nonpublic schools
had primary effect of advancing religion), The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. Ri\v.
47, 104-10 (1975).
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which "result[ed] in the direct advancement of religion." 2 1 Failing
to satisfy the second prong of the Lemon test the statute was declared
22
to be unconstitutional.
Subsequent to the district court's decision, Levitt II was appealed to the Supreme Court. 23 Vacating and remanding the lower
court's judgment, the Supreme Court afforded that court an opportunity to reconsider its decision in light of the intervening decision in
Wolman v. Walter 24 in which the Court upheld an Ohio statutory

scheme. 25 On remand, interpreting Wolman as representative of a
more flexible standard regarding state aid to sectarian schools, 26 the
court in Levitt III27 declared the legislative enactment to be in accordance with the constitutional mandate of the establishment
clause. 28
On appeal to the Supreme Court Levitt III was referred to as

Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan. 29
The Court applied the tripartite test to analyze the New York statu-

21 Committee

for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt ll),414 F. Supp.

1174, 1180 (1976). The Court concluded, "it is clear that the aid to the secular functions of
sectarian schools provided by the statute is in fact aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a
whole .
I..."
Id. For a discussion of the "separability doctrine," see note 20 supra.
22 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt II), 414 F. Supp. 1174,
1180 (1976).
23 100 S. Ct. at 846. The district court is a special three judge panel that convenes in
constitutional matters. The Supreme Court directly reviewed the case, precluding review by the
court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
24 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
25 Id. at 255.
26 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt 111), 461 F. Supp. 1123,
1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Applying the Wolinan rationale, the court interpreted \Volnian as
reviv[ing] the more flexible concept that state aid may be extended to such a
school's educational activities if it can be shown with a high degree of certainty that
the aid will only have secular value of legitimate interest to the State and does not
present any appreciable risk of being used to aid transmission of religious views.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Judge Ward, who authored Levitt 11,vigorously dissented because he did not view WVolullan
as retreating from Meek. Id. at 1133. He believed Meek was controlling iii Levitt 11 and distiuguished Wolinan from Meek on the basis of the direct substantial aid afforded by the Meek
statute. Id. Judge Ward concluded that the Levitt II statute advanced religion because of the
direct flow of funds which advanced a religious mission and because "no attempt ha[d] been
made to restrict payments to those expenditures which [were] related exclusively to the schools'
secular functions.'" Id. at 1135. In addition, he found it unconstitutional because it fostered
excessive entanglement with religion. Id.
27 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt 111),461 F.
Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
28 Id. at 1131.
29 100 S. Ct. 840 (1980).
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tory scheme authorizing funds to nonpublic schools for performing varions mandated tasks. 30 Reviewing the lower court's judgment, Justice White, writing the majority opinion, affirmed the district court's
conclusion that Wolhian v. Walter controlled the instant case. 31 The
statute involved in Wolman authorized funding for programs that
aided primarily sectarian schools. 32 The Ohio statute included a
provision for the loaning of secular textbooks, and permitted funding
for instructional equipment and materials, standardized testing and
scoring, diagnostic services to be performed on nonpublic school
premises, therapeutic services and guidance counseling to be offered
at public locations, and field trip transportation expenses. 33 The
Court upheld diagnostic services classifying them as "general welfare
services," 3 4 and declared the statutory provisions restricting the performance of therapeutic and guidance services to public locations as
not violative of the establishment clause. 35 The textbook loan plan,
which extended benefits to all school children, whether enrolled in
public or nonpublic schools, was similarly upheld. 36 In addition, the
Wolman plurality approved the testing and scoring provisions as not
fostering excessive entanglement.37

The Court invalidated the provi-

30 Id. at 846-51. See note 9 supra.
31 100 S. Ct. at 847. See Comment, Wolman v.

Walter and the Continuing Debate over

State Aid to Parochial Schools, 63 IowA L. REV. 543 (1977). See generally Note, Constitutional
Law-First Anendment-Establishment Clause-State Aid to Nonpublic Schoolchildren, 16
DUQ. L. REV. 253 (1977-78).
32 433 U.S. at 234. There were 720 chartered nonpublic schools in Ohio for the 1974-75
year, of which -all but 29 were sectarian. Id. More than 96% of the students attending nonpublic
schools were enrolled in sectarian schools; 92% attended Catholic schools. Id.
13,
Id. at 233.
34 Id. at 243-44.
35 Id. at 247. The Court distinguished these services from those offered in Meek on the
basis that the performance there occurred "in the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the
church-related school;" id., while the statute in Wolinan provided for the performance of services at "religiously neutral locations." Id.
36 Id. at 236-38. The plurality stated that:
Board of Education v. Allen has remained law, and we now follow as a matter of
stare decisis the principle that restriction of textbooks to those provided the public
schools is sufficient to ensure that the books will not be used for religious purposes.
Id. at 252 n.18.
Justice Marshall favored the overruling of Allen. 433 U.S. at 257 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). The textbook provision was upheld on the assumption that the
sectarian school's secular educational and religious instruction functions are separable. Id. This
separability doctrine, however, was rejected in Meek in the discussion of the teaching materials
and equipment. Id. at 257-58. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
37 Id. at 240-41. The Court distinguished the Levitt I statute because the Ohio plan did not
authorize reimbursements to nonpublic school personnel for the costs of administering or grading the tests. See id. at 239 1.7. Furthermore, the tests were not teacher-prepared. Id. at 240.
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sions authorizing the purchase and loan of instructional equipment
and materials and reimbursement for field trip transportation
costs. 38 Viewing the sectarian schools, not the students, as the true
recipients of the aid, the Court struck down the field trip expenses
reimbursement on excessive entanglement grounds, concluding that
the funding would demand close supervision of teachers to ensure
39
trips of a secular nature.
In the instant case, Justice White analogized to the Wohnan
statute; both the New York and Ohio enactments provided for
state-prepared tests administered by nonpublic school personnel on
nonpublic school premises.40 Noting that in contrast to the Ohio
statutory scheme, in which all of the tests were state-graded, the
New York plan provided for two nonpublic school-graded tests and
one state-graded test, the Court reasoned that because the tests were
composed of primarily objective type questions, the district court accurately concluded that there was an absence of any "substantial risk
that the examinations could be used for religious educational purposes." 4 1 Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's reasoning regarding the reimbursement provisions for recordkeeping and reporting services. 4 2 The New York statute required
the submission of attendance records for minors in addition to the
Basic Educational Data System report, which includes information
regarding faculty, support staff, student body, physical facilities, and
38 Id. at 255. The appellees tried to distinguish the instructional materials and equipment
provisions from those held unconstitutional in Meek by emphasizing that these materials were

not loaned to the nonpublic schools, as in Meek, but rather to the pupil or his parents. Id. at
250-51. The Court refused to accept the distinction, interpreting it as "exalt[ing] form over

substance." Id. at 250.
39 Id. at 252-55.
40 100 S. Ct. at 846-48.

41 Id. at 848. There were three types of state-prepared tests. Id. The pupil evaluation program (PEP) tests, offered in grades three and six, and optionally in grade nine, were graded by

nonpublic school personnel, and the examinations were composed entirely of objective questions. Id. The Comprehensive Achievement Tests, administered in grades nine through twelve,

were also graded by nonpublic school personnel and consisted essentially of objective type questions with multiple choice answers. The Court, however, acknowledged that some of these tests
had the possibility of including one or two essays. Id. The third type of test, The Regents
Scholarship and College Qualifications Tests (RSCQT), was state-graded. Id. See id. at 847 n.4.
42 100 S. Ct. at 848-49. The district court explained that "since record-keeping is essentially
a ministerial task lacking ideological content or use, it is not challengeable on Meek's theor, that

any state assistance to the educational process advances religion." Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt III), 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The district court analogized the recordkeeping function to the bus transportation expenses

in Everson. Id. Furthermore, the Court rejected the "freeing up" argument that since schools
would be required to expend their own funds for performing these tasks, the school benefited
because state reimbursement "frees up" funds for religious purposes. Id. See Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 775. See note 9 supra.
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curriculum of the school. 4 3 Characterizing these functions as primarily secular in purpose and effect, the Court concluded that provi44
sions authorizing aid were not violative of the establishment clause.
A significant distinction existed between the Ohio and New York
statutes. The New York statute authorized direct cash reimbursement
to the nonpublic schools for grading and administering the tests,
whereas the Ohio statute authorized payment to an independent testing service for expenses associated with the grading of nonpublic
school tests..4
Because the Regan Court previously characterized
the grading of the examinations as a function which had a secular
purpose and primarily secular effect, Justice White, in accord with
the lower court, refused to categorize this distinction as one of constitutional significance. 46 Noting that it was illogical to distinguish
betwxeen grading services performed by a nonpublic school employee
and a state employee or independent testing service, Justice White
"decline[d] to embrace a formalistic dichotomy that brore]
so little
relationship either to common sense or to the realities of school finance. "4 7 In addition, the majority emphasized that safeguards included in the statutory scheme aided to guard against reimbursement
for sectarian services. 48
To determine whether or not the legislation fostered excessive

entanglement between the state and religion, the Court analyzed the
statutorylprocedure for reiml)ursenment. 4
Nonpublic schools receiving aid imist maintain a separate account for reimbursable expenses

and are required to submit an application for reimbursement to the

43 100 S. Ct. at 848.
44 Id. The Court noted the lower -[c]ourt's finding that '[t]he lion's share of the reimbursenients to private schools under the Statute would be for attendance-reporting.' " Id. n.5. It was
estimated that reimbursements to nonpublic schools would amount to $8,000,000 to 810,000,000
a year. Comnittee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty \. Levitt (Levitt III), 461 F.
Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In addition, between 85% and 95% of the total reimbursement would be accounted for b\ the costs attributable to attendance-taking. id.
45 100 S. Ct. at 848.
41 Id. at 848-49. The district court stated:
there does not appear to be an\ reason why payments to sectarian schools to cover

the cost of specified activities would have the impermissible effect of advancing
religion if the same activities performed bs sectarian school personnel without
reimbursement but with State-furnished materials have no such effect.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt III), 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1129
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).

47 100 S. Ct. at 849. Compare this reasoning to the aid to sectarian school enterprise theory
at note 20 supra. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 365-66; Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nsquist, 413 U.S. at 781-83 and 783 n.39.
4s 100 S. Ct. at 849.
41 1i. at 849-50.
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Commissioner of Education. 50 The Commissioner is empowered and
mandated to audit vouchers prior to the approval of releasing authorized funds. 51 Furthermore, the statute provides for the inspection of accounts by the State Department of Audit and Control for
verification of costs. 52 Describing the reimbursement process as
"straightforward and susceptible to the routinization that characterizes
most reimbursement schemes,''5 3 Justice White concluded that the
statutory scheme did not violate the third prong of the constitutional
test. 54 The majority refused to address an additional aspect related
to excessive entanglement-the issue of political divisiveness along
religious lines.55 This concept concerns division among religious factions resulting from public debate regarding aid to nonpublic
schools. 56
In an attempt to clarify the standard enunciated in Meek the
majority rejected the contention that any aid to sectarian schools,
even funds designated for secular functions, must be invalidated because these sectarian institutions are religion pervasive. 57 In his endeavor to maintain the vitality of Meek, Justice White asserted that
the Wolman decision, rendered subsequent to Meek, presented proof
of the repudiation of such a broad doctrine. 58
Justice Blackmun, writing a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, argued that the significance of the establishment clause demanded a more detailed analysis of the New
York legislative enactment. 59 Accepting the majority's view that the
statute revealed a secular purpose, Justice Blackmun analyzed the
primary effect and the potential for excessive entanglement. 60 The

50 Id. at 849. See 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 507, § 7, as amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 508.
5' 100 S. Ct. at 850.
52 Id.
53 Id.
" Id. Justice White described the tasks for which nonpublic schools would be reimbursed as
'discreet and clearly identifiable.' " Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Libertv v. Levitt (Levitt III), 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (1978)). Furthermore, the majority concluded that "[o]n its face, therefore, the New York plan suggests no excessive entanglement,
and we are not prepared to read into the plan as an inevitability the bad faith upon which any
future excessive entanglement would be predicated." 100 S. Ct. at 850 (footnote omitted).
55 100 S. Ct. at 850 n.8.
56 J.NOWAK, supra note 3, at 854. See note 93 infra and accompanying text.
57 100 S. Ct. at 850-51. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
58 100 S. Ct. 850-51.
5' Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

60 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dissent emphasized that most of the direct financial assistance afforded to sectarian schools was associated with attendance reporting
costs. 61 The fundamental difference between the Ohio statute in
XVolna) and the plan in the instant case concerned direct financial
aid; the Ohio plan did not include an authorization for direct financial
assistance, instead it allocated funds for tests to be distributed to
other than nonpublic school personnel.62 Moreover, the dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Wolan.63 Justice
Blackmun viewed VXoliman as reaffirming the Meek principle that direct aid to the religious function of a sectarian school necessarily
aided the sectarian institution. 64 The invalidation, in Woinan, of the
loan of instructional materials and equipment and the reimbursement
for field trip transportation costs reinforced the constitutional unacceptability of aid to a sectarian school; therefore, Wolnan necessitated a characterization of the New York scheme as one which advanced religion. 65
The reimbursement for expenses incurred from the reporting and
testing requirements, which were necessary functions for maintaining
accreditation status, was viewed by Justice Blackmun as a subsidy
'to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole.' "66 Furthermore,
the maintaining of pupil attendance records was considered "essential
to the religious mission of sectarian schools." 67 Therefore, the failure
of the legislature to include a provision mandating the separation of
attendance taking expenses for religious purposes from those incurred

Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
62 100 S. Ct. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Wolnan, 433 U.S. at 238-39 & 239 n.7.
61

See text accompanying note 45 supra.
63 100 S. Ct. at 852-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" 1I.
65 Id.
6 Id.

at 853-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
at 854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 657

(Brennan, J., concurring)). Justice Blackmun reasoned that it was necessary for sectarian schools
to perform the tasks required in § 3 of Chapter 507 or lose accreditatinn. Id. (Blackmun, J..
dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that
[tIhese reporting and testing requirements would be met by the schools whether
reimbursement were available or not. As such, the attendance, informational, and
testing expenses compensated by Chapter 507 are essential to the overall educational functioning of sectarian schools in New York in the same way instruction in
secular subjects is essential. Therefore, just as direct aid for ostensibly secular purposes by provision of instructional materials or direct financial subsidy is forbidden
by the Establishment Clause, so direct aid for the performance of recordkeeping
and testing activities that are an essential part of the sectarian school's functioning
also is interdicted.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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for state purposes constituted a violation of the establishment
clause. 68 Justice Blackmun concluded that the New York plan was
not constitutionally acceptable because the direct financial assistance
aided the sectarian institution and advanced religion. 69
According to the dissent, because the New York statute fostered
excessive entanglement by requiring state surveillance to ensure
judgments of a secular nature by teachers grading the examinations,
the plan failed the third prong of the constitutional test. 70 Other
potentially troublesome aspects of the statute concerned the state's
ability to determine whether nonpublic school teachers' time was devoted solely to secular activities and the state's need to review exams
which vary annually to ensure secular content. 71
Justice Stevens, filing a separate dissent, characterized the majoritv position as one in a long line of "ad hoc decisions. "72 Rather than
justifying aid to sectarian institutions, Justice Stevens recommended a
strict construction of the establishment clause; he "would resurrect
the 'high and impregnable' wall between church and state constructed
73
by the Framers of the First Amendment."
Subsequent to the Meek decision, commentators concluded that
the Court would strike down provisions authorizing aid to the educational function of sectarian schools except those involving textbook
loans and basic incidental services. 74 Prior to Regan, it appeared as
though Wolman confirmed this conclusion.
One commentator
specifically attributed the validation of the standardized testing and
scoring provisions of the XVolman statute to language in Meek which
referred to "substantial aid," and that a plan authorizing less than
substantial aid would only result in an incidental benefit to sectarian
institutions. 76 Therefore, the provisions authorizing the loan of instructional materials and equipment and reimbursement for field trip
transportation expenses were invalidated as aiding the sectarian enterprise and unconstitutionally advancing religion. 77
" Id.

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69

" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18,
rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947)).
74 Nowak, The Supreme Court, The Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Education,
70 Nw. U.L. RE:v. 883, 889 (1976); Hilton, supra note 9, at 333, 342; Comment, supra note 31,
at 544.
7' See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255, 251 n.18; note 74 supra and accompanying text.
76 Comment, supra note 31, at 555. See generally Hilton, supra note 9.
-- Comment, supra note 31, at 555.
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NOTES

The Regan majority rejected the contention that Meek stood for
the broad proposition "that any aid to even secular educational functions of a sectarian school is forbidden." ' 78 The Court reiterated Justice Powell's statement in Wolman that the Wolnan and Meek holdings were consistent because " 'Meek [did not] hold that all loans of
secular instructional material and equipment' inescapably have the effect of direct advancement of religion." 79 Therefore, the Wohnan
testing services were constitutionally acceptable because they did not
have the primary effect of advancing the sectarian enterprise. 80 Even
Judge Ward, who dissented in the district court Levitt III decision,
argued that Wolman did not sub silentio reject the Meek rationale and
disallow all aid to the educational function of religiously affiliated
schools; rather the Wohnan plurality affirmed the Meek rationale that
substantial direct aid violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment. 81 This reasoning is further reinforced by a close
analysis of the Ohio statute under review in Wobuan which did not
authorize payments to the nonpublic school personnel; hence no direct aid was afforded to sectarian schools. 82
The majority's analysis, upholding the consistency of Meek and
Wobnan, fails, however, in light of the "substantial aid" afforded by
the statutorv scheme in Regan. In Meek, the Court characterized the
twelve million dollars authorized to be distributed to 1,320 nonpublic
schools in Pennsvxania, of which seventy-five percent were religiouslh affiliated, as "imassive ...
[and] neither indirect nor incidental. "813 Surely, the New York statute's eight to ten million dollar
allotment to predominantly religion pervasive institutions requires a
similar characterization. Concluding that the legislative enactment
was unconstitutional, the Court in Levitt II did not discern any 'egall\, relevant distinction between the 812 million of public funds involved in Meek and the $8-$10 million at issue [in Levitt II]."84a
If the holdings in Meek and Wolnan are compatible, as the
Court declared, then the XAVolman philosophy should not have been
considered controlling in the instant case. Justice Blackmun, in his

78
79

100 S. Ct. at 850.
Id. at 851 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part)).
80
81

Wolman, 433 U.S. at 240.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt III), 461 F. Supp.

1123, 1131-38 (1978).
82 See Wolan, 433 U.S. at 238-39 & 239 n.7; text accompanying notes 45 & 62 supra.
Meek, 421 U.S. at 365. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt (Levitt 11), 414 F. Supp. 1174.

1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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dissenting opinion, articulated the fundamental differences bet\een
the Ohio plan in Wolman and the New York statute. 85 The state aid
to sectarian schools -afforded by the Ohio plan consisted of standardized tests and scoring services performed by "neutral testing organizations." 8 6 In contrast, the New York scheme authorizes direct financial aid to the nonpublic school employees for costs incurred in
administering and grading the tests. 87 None of the forms of assistance upheld in Wolman authorized direct financial assistance to the
sectarian institutions; rather the constitutionally permissible provisions provided public health services, and therapeutic, remedial, and
guidance programs.88 Therefore, just as the loans of instructional
equipment and field trip transportation reimbursements were invalidated in WVolmant because the direct aid resulted in the advancement
of the sectarian enterprise, 89 the reimbursement for nonpublic school
personnel costs incurred from complying with state reporting and
testing requirements, which are mandated by state accreditation provisions, have the same impermissible effect.
Furthermore, two of the New York examinations are graded by
nonpublic school employees, with one test "includ[ing] an essay question or two. '"90 Assuming that there is "no substantial risk that the
examinations could be used for religious educational purposes,"91 it
will still be necessary for the state to intervene to ensure the absence
of propagation of religious views. This surveillance, in addition to the
difficult task of ascertaining that reimbursed personnel expenses are
devoted only to secular activities, necessitates excessive government
entanglement with religion. 92 Addressing this argument, the Court
justified its refusal to analyze the effect of the New York statutory
scheme in terms of the potential danger for political divisiveness by
noting that the XVolmtian decision did not discuss the issue. 93

85 100 S. Ct. at 852-55 (Blackmun,

J., dissenting).
at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 852 (Blackmun J., dissenting).

86 Id.
87

11 See
89 433
90 100
91 100

notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
U.S. at 255.
S. Ct. at 848. See note 41 supra.
S. Ct. at 848.
92 Id. at 855 (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
" Id. at 850 n.8. See text accompanying notes 55 & 56 supra. The political divisiveness
argument has been raised in prior establishment clause cases. See \Valz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Brennan has declared the political divisiveness issue as significant entanglement to invalidate a statutory scheme. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Nyquist the Court described the potential of the
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NOTES

Should the Regan analysis be interpreted as an abandonment of
the political divisiveness factor for testing the potential entanglement
between government and religion? Is the Court's acceptance of the
New York statute's "ample safeguards" to ensure against "excessive or
misdirected reimbursements" a signal that a more liberal attitude has
been adopted concerning the constitutional permissibility of direct financial aid to sectarian schools? Has the Court, in effect, nullified the
rationale of Meek? If controversy concerning permissible forms of
state aid to parochial schools is to be resolved, and the aforementioned questions are to be answered, a new constitutional test must
be formulated that will be consistently applied. The Regan decision
fails to delineate a clear mode of analysis-one is needed to provide
legislators and parents with specific constitutional guidelines to ensure that the application of a new standard will serve "as a guidepost
for determining the outcome" rather than "as a framework for structuring opinions." 94
Geri Landau Squire

danger as "a 'warning signal' not to be ignored." 413 U.S. at 798 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 625).
'4 Young, Constitutional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Related SchoolsInternal Tensions Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 783,

788 (1977).

